NATO Membership: Catch Me If You Can

The Moldovan President's recent interview to the Russian daily Kommersant made the headlines this week in local media. He announced that Moldova is soon to finally resolve the Transnistrian conflict with Russia's full support. Russia requires Moldova to do just one more thing: to prepare a declaration of neutrality and invite US, EU, OSCE, Russia and Ukraine to co-sign it. In other words, to officially abandon the possibility to join NATO in the future, thus remaining, for an indefinite time, in Russia's sphere of influence.

No problem. Moldova's Constitution already recognizes this status. However, public opinion has started questioning this status and hope of eventually changing it by moving closer to NATO was growing. To an international observer, Moldova's way of dealing with Russia over its Transnistrian conflict (and many other issues) might seem at least cowardly, particularly if compared to bold and defiant Georgia and assertive and colorful Ukraine. One would assume: different negotiation approaches - different outcomea and rewards. Not the case. How are Georgia and Ukraine being treated for openly defying Russia and aspiring to join the NATO and then EU? They get a cold shoulder from EU's and NATO's major player, Germany, in the face of Chancellor Angela Merkell who explicitely opposes the possibility that these two countries enter a new phase of their relationship with NATO - the Membership Action Plan(MAP).

"Countries that are involved in regional or internal conflicts can not become members [of the alliance]"

How should Moldova understand this statement? Pretty straightforward: Germany doesn't seem to care for the difficult and bumpy road from totalitarism to democracy in countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Indeed, why would Germany want to spoil its lucrative political and economic friendship with Russia? Perhaps these three countries are not worth such a sacrifice or maybe haven't yet earned the right to aspire to NATO membership. However, I was really hoping that at least the European Union with its polical philosophy and ideology would be worth it.

How a War Monument Can Cause a Diplomatic Crisis

The Estonian-Russian diplomatic crisis has rapidly escalated in the last days. The government of Estonia – an independent EU country, formerly a Soviet republic – makes a decision to relocate a World War II monument - the Bronze Soldier – from the downtown to a place in the outskirts of the city of Tallinn. Common sense tells me that, whatever the reasons, this is a type of decision that a government of an independent country (even of a city government) should have enough authority to make without having to consider the possibility of infuriating the government of another country. However, when we talk of Russia, common sense is rarely a guiding principle. The current diplomatic crisis between Russia and Estonia shows how Russian high government officials make offensive, unjustified and destabilizing declarations addressing another country’s government and, by representation, its citizens.

Here is an Vladimir Socor’s article on the situation.

In another article he reveals the elements of the sophisticated Kremlin’s assault:

They include cyber attacks from within Russia’s Presidential Administration against the Estonian presidency’s and government’s electronic communications; political demands, backed by economic sanctions threats, to change the Estonian government; siege laid by Kremlin-created organizations to the Estonian Embassy in Moscow; and instigatory coverage of the April 27-29 violent riots of Russian youth in Tallinn by Russia’s state television.

Also, he warns that Moscow’s goal is not what it might appear:

...Moscow’s operational goal is not to elicit condemnation of Estonia or Latvia. It is, rather, to portray these Baltic states as irritants to the West’s relations with Russia and to induce Western governments to remain silent, instead of supporting the Baltic states against such bullying. Moscow hopes to draw wedges among Western allies through protracted application of this tactic.

Moldova vs. Russia: Next Round

The biggest and most important event in terms of Moldova's foreign policy is the recent official meeting of the Moldovan President Voronin with the Russian President Putin that took place in Moscow. Its importance derives from the fact that the relations between these two countries have been tense for the last three years, since Moldova's refusal to sign the Kozak Memorandum prepared by Russia, and intended as a solution to the Transnistrian conflict. It should not be suprising that the Kozak Memorandum, as any other agreement prepared unilaterally by Russia for Moldova, given the present distribution of power, completely neglected Moldova's territorial integrity aspirations.

What this official meeting, first in the last three years, will bring about is still unclear. There are high hopes related to improved political and commercial relations with Russia. This meeting marks the beginning of a new phase in the political dialogue, and will most likely contribute to stabilization of Moldo-Russian relations. There is no other way. However, again and as always, it's up to the Moldovan government to act and negotiate strategically so as to obtain as much as it is realistically possible from this renewed relationship with Russia. The underlying disequilibrium of political and economic power between Moldova and Russia will never change, thus the best Moldova can do is to learn to take advantage of opportunities, be diplomatically nimble and smart, and continuously seek support from larger powers that have the ability to negotiate with Russia on more equal terms.